incoherent position (in a sense to be explained), Cohen's entanglement with it was to that extent unfortunate. By way of explanation, I want to propose that Cohen became embroiled, initially by virtue of an exchange with Ronald Dworkin, in a debate about the metric of equality -the issue of the appropriate respect (resources or welfare or capabilities, etc.) in which people should be rendered equal as a matter of justice -and this spilled over into a further debate about the ways in which personal responsibility might justify inequality along one or other of these dimensions. But this debate was conducted on a liberal terrain that was uncongenial to Cohen, whose own political convictions were of radically socialist kind. 6 We can appreciate this point by reflecting on a somewhat curious remark of Cohen's made when discussing what he calls 'Dworkin's fundamental insight', which he aimed to develop in his own version of luck egalitarianism: 'Dworkin has, in effect, performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian Right: the idea of choice and responsibility '. 7 Since egalitarianism is rightly regarded as emblematic of the political philosophy of the Left, why would one think that it a service to incorporate within it the strongest idea of its opponents, rather than a retreat or a capitulation? This sentence stands in stark contrast to an essay of Cohen's published five years later in which he castigates revisionists who want to replace traditional socialist values ('community and equality') with principles of social justice whose egalitarianism is heavily tempered with concerns about desert, incentives, freedom of choice, and so forth. 8 In that essay Cohen operates with a sharp distinction between the values of the Right and the values of the Left, and argues, citing the work of Hayek and Nozick on the other side of the fence, that the greatest service that philosophers can perform for their political counterparts is to develop and stand by fundamental theory that makes no concessions to what is politically acceptable in the short run.
According to this view, the undoubted popularity in current political thinking of the ideas of choice and responsibility should not carry any weight when a philosopher is engaged in the task of exploring his or her deepest convictions about the idea of justice. Of course, Cohen might have thought that choice and responsibility were ethically important ideas irrespective of whether they were championed by the Right or the Left. But then the next step would presumably be to 6 It is certainly true that Cohen in earlier writing had engaged at length with libertarian thinking, especially with the idea of self-ownership: see G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) , esp. ch. 6. The reasons for this engagement, however, were somewhat different, having to do with apparent parallels between Marxist and libertarian ideas about self-ownership and exploitation. For more on Cohen's own view of his relationship to liberalism, see 'Self-Ownership, History and Socialism: an Interview with G. A. Cohen', Imprints, 1 (1996), 7-25. 7 Cohen, 'On the Currency', p. 32.
8 G. A. Cohen, 'Back to Socialist Basics', New Left Review, 207 (1994), 3-16, reprinted Why not Socialism?, published in the year of his death, it reappears as 'socialist equality of opportunity', which disallows inequalities that arise from differences in natural talent, but 'tolerates inequality of benefit, where the inequality reflects the genuine choice of parties who are initially equally placed and who may therefore reasonably be held responsible for the consequences of those choices'. 14 But although generally supportive of this principle, Cohen worries that it might 9 The intention could not realistically be to expect rightwingers to embrace luck egalitarianism itself, but rather to show that the latter view could encompass a sufficiently rich understanding of choice and responsibility to discredit their ideological claim that the Left was indifferent or hostile to these ideas. starting point by processes that appear permissible, and suggests that we might need to introduce a distinction between justice and legitimacy to handle them: the outcomes should be described as legitimate but not just (or else, he suggests, we might want to distinguish between justice as fairness, applying to the initial distribution, and justice as legitimacy, applying to the steps that produce the final distribution). 18 But such a distinction, he recognizes, would cause problems for luck egalitarianism, understood as a theory of distributive justice. For the luck egalitarian wants to say that inequalities that arise between individuals as a result of the choices they make are not merely legitimate but actually just. 'By virtue of the content of the luck-egalitarian doctrine, the status of justice proper is conferred, in an unqualified way, on the favoured upshots.' Cohen 15 Option luck is luck that befalls somebody as a result of a calculated risk they have chosen to take (like being drenched because you decided to go out on a showery day without an umbrella), as opposed to the 'brute luck' they experience through the impact of unanticipated forces over which they have no control (like being hit by debris from an aeroplane passing overhead). As will be apparent, the two kinds of luck are not categorically distinct, but describe points close to either end of a spectrum. It is worth reflecting at this point on different ways in which someone's choice might alter the level of advantage they enjoy, given an initial set of holdings. One possibility is that they become better or worse off by acquiring new tastes, such that the goods they already have provide them with higher or lower levels of welfare (which I am assuming with Cohen is at least one component of 'advantage'). For example, a person who only has access to a particular kind of music learns to appreciate that music and then enjoys listening to it. Such deliberate changes of preference have been much discussed in the literature on luck egalitarianism, perhaps over-discussed, since a focus on this kind of case draws attention away from several other (and perhaps more consequential) instances in which a person makes choices that leave him better or worse off. A second type of case is one in which a person directly alters the value of one or more of the resources she justly has simply by the way in which she treats it. For example she destroys it, or allows it to decay, or on the other hand she finds an unexpected use for it, or enables it to develop in a way that allows it to reach its full potential (for her). In such a case the change that is brought about has no effect on the resources that others hold, so inequalities arise simply by virtue of the better or worse use of the things that each of us possesses. Thus imagine that you and I each begin with a bowl of unripe peaches, but whereas you wait carefully until the fruit has reached its ripest condition, and then begin to eat, I am either too hasty or too dilatory and therefore get less enjoyment from my fruit. Here the inequality arises simply from the impact of the choices that each of us make on our own resources: what you decide to do with your peaches has no effect on my peaches or on what I choose to do with them.
Now if the effect of individual choice were to be restricted to the two types of case discussed above, then luck egalitarianism would not be incoherent. Assuming that we have successfully identified an initial position in which levels of advantage have been rendered equal, thus eliminating the inegalitarian effects of brute luck from the world as we know it, the inequalities that emerge through the mechanisms just described do not involve any brute luck. It is of course true that the inequality that may arise has not itself been chosen. I have chosen to eat my fruit too early, but I have not chosen that you should eat yours later, so I have not chosen that you should gain more enjoyment than me. 26 One could say it is brute luck from my point of view that I am worse off than you. On the other hand, it is hard to think that this could be represented as an injustice, since I could have chosen to be more attentive to the ripeness of my peaches. So although one could still find fault with the luck egalitarian principle of justice -for example on the well-trodden ground that it denies that people who make very bad choices have any claim of justice to be helped out of their predicament -one couldn't claim it was incoherent when applied to this type of case.
It follows that there is a hypothetical world in which luck egalitarianism would not be liable to any charge of incoherence, and that is one in which the effects of a person's choices only extended to their own resources and other components of advantage, never to anybody else's. Each person, so to speak, lived in a self-contained bubble that prevented the decisions they made from having any impact outside of the bubble itself. Many discussions of luck egalitarianism seem implicitly to assume such a world. Either they address the problem of whether or in what circumstances people might be able to demand compensation for changes of taste that leave them worse off, or they discuss imprudent choices, such as engaging in risky sports without having taken out insurance first, that leave the chooser in a very poor condition. In neither case does the impact of choice extend beyond the chooser himself (unless of course it can be shown that justice does after all demand that he receive compensation, when somebody else will be required to pay it).
But this is really a misleading picture, because in our own world the choices that somebody makes will very often have a direct or roundabout impact on the levels of advantage enjoyed by others.
How so? One class of cases involves choices that involve transferring resources to other people -for example giving them gifts or buying their services. These will typically disturb the initial equality of advantage that we are presupposing. Now it might appear that if we think of such processes as occurring between two individuals, there is still no problem because the inequality that emerges between the donor and the recipient has been chosen by them both: when A gives B a gift, thereby becoming less well-off than B, 27 A chooses to move to a lower level of advantage overall, and B in accepting the gift chooses to be moved to a higher level. No element of differential brute luck is involved. But this overlooks the position of C, D, and everyone else who has been made worse off than B through no choice or fault of their own, and who moreover will typically lack the opportunity to move back to level pegging with B. From their point of view, the inequality that has arisen is a piece of brute bad luck. 28 (Bequests from parent to child are a familiar example of such choiceinduced differential luck.)
The other, perhaps even more common, kind of case is one in which, without direct resource A second possibility would be to say that a person may indeed make other-affecting choices, but it then becomes his responsibility to correct for their inegalitarian effects. We might think of this as applying a tort law model to individual choice. Under tort law, it is accepted that one person may damage another's property inadvertently or negligently, but he has then to compensate the other by making a transfer that ideally will restore the person to the same level of advantage as she enjoyed before the accident. But although a scheme of this kind would not strictly speaking prevent choices from being made, it will act as an enormous deterrent by making any other-regarding choice potentially extremely costly. If one makes a gift, for example, then one has to be ready to compensate all those people who did not receive a gift, and whose position was therefore lowered by comparison to the beneficiary on the scale of advantage. 37 Of course it is impossible to imagine such a scheme coming into effect, given the epistemic difficulties involved in tracking all of the remoter effects of individual choices. But my point is that even if that difficulty were overcome, once again the scope for personal choice is severely restricted, because the person contemplating a choice has to try to anticipate the costs that she might incur if her choice proves to have a significant impact on others. Everyone who enters a race or a job contest has to contemplate the possibility that if she wins she will have to compensate the disadvantaged losers, for example.
A defender of luck egalitarianism might protest at this point that it is a misunderstanding to focus on the effects of particular choices that an individual person might make. Recall that the aim of luck egalitarianism is to protect people from exposure to brute luck disadvantage. What matters here, it might be said, are overall levels of advantage measured over reasonable intervals of time.
Momentary fluctuations hardly matter so long as they are offset later by movements in the opposite direction. A's gift to B should be of no concern to egalitarians provided C, D and all the rest receive gifts from others in due course, such that over time everyone gets presents of roughly the same value. Luck egalitarian practice should not be aimed at directly curbing choice or its effects, but simply at ensuring that the cumulative effect of many choices over time is not such as to disturb initial equality. If there is a need to compensate those who lose overall, resources should be transferred not from those whose choices have caused the inequality, but from those who benefit from it.
Luck egalitarians can of course entertain the hope that they will live in a world where to a very large extent the effects of other-affecting choices even themselves out in the way suggested in the last paragraph, so that corrective policies need only to be light-touch. But this seems to dodge the issue of principle, which concerns the compatibility of choice and equality. So consider the following case.
A wealthy philanthropist decides to establish a large cash prize for any scientist who is able to identify the faulty gene that allows a particular form of cancer to develop. 38 One day a scientist succeeds in this quest and the cash is handed over. A very large inequality has been created which there is no reason to think will be counteracted by later events. The point then, is that unless other-affecting choices happen to cancel one another out in such a way that only very minor disturbances to equal advantage are created, luck egalitarians will need to put in place quite far-reaching mechanisms to compensate the unlucky which will also, however, very often have the effect of frustrating the choices that are producing the inequality. As I suggested earlier, it seems that the two halves of the luck-egalitarian principle are at war with one another. In seeking to protect people from the brute bad luck that other's responsible choices may impose on them, it seems that we have to curtail the scope of choice so radically that it no longer exemplifies 'the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian Right'.
There is, however, a different way of responding to the incoherence objection that a luck egalitarian might try to pursue. Rather than circumscribing choice in such a way that it no longer has inegalitarian effects, she might narrow her opposition to brute luck inequality such that only some forms of bad brute luck will need to be compensated for on luck-egalitarian grounds. In particular, she might discount brute luck that results simply from individuals exercising choices within certain institutional constraints. She might draw inspiration here from Kok-Chor Tan's defence of 'institutional luck egalitarianism'. According to Tan:
Luck egalitarians ought not to be in the business of mitigating all natural contingencies (due to luck) that people face. As an aspect of social justice, luck egalitarianism is only concerned with 39 Imagine a bar in which when a customer orders a drink, the bar-tender uses a complex and opaque algorithm to decide which beverage is actually served to her. Would we say that this is a bar in which customers are able to choose their drinks?
how institutions deal with such natural contingencies. Its goal is to ensure that institutions are not arranged so as to convert a natural trait (a matter of luck) into actual social advantages or disadvantages for persons.
40
As this passage may suggest, Tan is thinking primarily about the effects of people's natural characteristics on their levels of welfare. The fact that good-looking people can easily attract friends and lovers while ugly people cannot is not, according to Tan, the kind of inequality with which luck egalitarians should be concerned. But if a society's institutions allow people to earn more by virtue of their looks, then that would be an injustice by luck egalitarian standards, since 'institutions should not be designed in ways that turn natural facts about persons into social advantages or disadvantages for them'. 41 According to institutional luck egalitarianism, therefore, the scope of justice is limited: not all unchosen inequalities are condemned at the bar of justice, but only those that stem from a society's institutional arrangements. considers an institution such as inheritance. It is a natural fact that I am the child of a particular person, but it is the institutional arrangements (the law of bequest, taxation, etc.) that govern inheritance that may turn this into a considerable social advantage. More generally, if choice is going to have the significance that it needs to have for luck egalitarianism to fulfil its ideological mission, it must involve the capacity to control and dispose of material things, and this implies that the effects of choice will be institutionally mediated.
Of course, by exempting some of the ways in which persons can affect each other from luck egalitarian scrutiny, Tan does remove some cases in which the demands of choice and equality would otherwise conflict. Extending this approach, we could avoid the conflict altogether simply by circumscribing an area within which individual choice will be allowed to operate, with its attendant effects, and then not counting these effects as 'brute luck' for their targets. This might be done by invoking some third principle that would then be used to resolve the conflict between choice and equality. For example, Zofia Stemplowska has advocated an interest-balancing approach to deal with the related question of how far we should allow individuals to bear the costs of their own imprudent choices, and how far we should protect them by socialising the costs, so that everyone is covered by a common fund. 44 She understands this as involving a balancing of people's interest in freedom with their interest in security. We might adopt a similar approach to an issue such as inheritance: we would set the interest testators have in being able to bequeath their assets without any restriction against the interest beneficiaries have in avoiding the inequality that would result from an unlimited right to bequeath, and find some middle ground solution. As a way of deciding upon public policy, this makes perfectly good sense. But we need to be clear that this is no longer a matter of developing an internally coherent principle of 'egalitarian justice' that gives appropriate scope to choice and responsibility. Instead it involves a straightforward trade-off between a concern for equality and a concern for the personal freedom to use and dispose of one's assets as one chooses.
Rescuing Cohen from Luck Egalitarianism
To avoid any possible misunderstanding, it is worth emphasizing at this point that the incoherence I have identified in luck egalitarianism has nothing to do with problems of practical implementation. Looking now at the first half of the socialist slogan, which covers people's contribution to social welfare, Cohen assumes that people should use their talents in whatever way is most productive, and for as long a duration as has been agreed in the community to which they belong. This is subject to two important riders. First, work that is more burdensome than average can be compensated by providing the worker with more leisure or extra resources. Second, each individual has a 'legitimate personal prerogative' either to work less or to use their talents in less productive ways: thus a limit is set on the social demands that may be placed on a person that reflects the interest she may have in pursuing a particular plan of life. 51 Or as Cohen himself puts it:
The old communist slogan 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his need' was at best poorly formulated, because it suggested that the more able should give more of themselves irrespective of the needs that might thereby be fulfilled or frustrated. To avoid unfair burden on the talented, or on anyone else for that matter, the first part of the slogan should, instead, be constrained by its second part: no one should be expected to serve in a fashion that will unduly depress her position, in comparison with others, with respect to what she needs to have to live a fulfilling life.
other's'. 53 Thus if, like Cohen, we also value equality because it encourages personal relations of community, the communist slogan scores over luck egalitarianism by bringing the ideas of justice and community into harmony with one another (I noted earlier Cohen's discomfort on noticing that the luck egalitarian principle, here rechristened 'socialist equality of opportunity', might conflict with the idea of community, or as he put it, 'it would of course be a considerable pity if we had to conclude that community and justice were potentially incompatible moral ideals'. However it is not clear to me what reason one could have for wanting to hold on to the latter principle once the ability/need principle has been spelt out in the way suggested above; the concerns expressed by Gilabert about 'having expansive opportunities to lead a flourishing life' which he thinks luck-egalitarianism protects seem to be fully catered for by the former. 55 The reference to desert as a possible vindicator of inequality in the passage from p. 7 of Rescuing Justice and Equality that I cited at the beginning of this chapter is therefore an anomaly. On pp. 15-16 Cohen writes that 'no one has a rightful claim, based on desert, or on any other antecedent condition, to have more resources than anyone else' and this is the premise that runs throughout his lengthy and critical engagement with Rawls in that book. Ideas of desert are always associated with anti-egalitarian positions to the right of Rawls. 
